Carbon capture and storage (CCS) has gained increasing attention following the launch of the Northern Lights storage project and the completion of Heidelberg Materials’ carbon capture facility in Brevik. While much of the technology is relatively mature and has been used in the petroleum industry for decades, CCS is still an emerging solution in climate mitigation. And like many innovations, numerous projects fail to reach completion. A common refrain is that creating the new value chains needed to make CCS commercially viable is a significant challenge.

Nevertheless, CCS is a critical tool for achieving net-zero emissions in many climate scenarios. Tsimafei Kazlou has studied how many CCS projects must succeed to meet climate targets, with his findings published in Nature Climate Change.

<2°C: What is this research about?

Tsimafei Kazlou: – Today we see a wave of interest in Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). This is evident from the numerous plans and projects being announced and the significant policy support being directed toward CCS. For example, in the US, we have the Inflation Reduction Act, and in the European Union, there’s the Net Zero Industry Act and the more recent Industrial Carbon Management Strategy adopted in February 2024.

A conversation with

Tsimafei Kazlou is a PhD student at the Center for Climate and Energy Transformation at the University of Bergen.

There’s a lot of interest in this technology from various stakeholders. In addition, we also know that climate mitigation pathways—those scenarios reviewed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—typically project a significant role for CCS in meeting climate targets. On the other hand, the feasibility of large-scale and long-term expansion of CCS technologies is often heavily debated. The question we had in mind is: what is the gap between (1) the announced plans, (2) what we can feasibly achieve from those plans, and (3) what is required to meet the climate targets?

– How did you go about figuring this out?

– We approached this with the technology diffusion theory, where technology adoption typically follows an S-curve with distinct growth phases. Using empirical evidence from advanced policy-driven technologies and their deployment, we projected the most optimistic but feasible limit to CCS deployment in each phase.

– And what did you find?

– In the first phase, the formative phase, before the technology takes off and becomes largely commercial, technology growth is very erratic. We looked at project plans currently being announced, and unlike other analyses, we also examined past project plans. We found that around 2010, there was a similar spike in interest in CCS. Our analysis shows that out of this peak, 88% of projects failed. So, to understand what can happen to CCS in the near future, we shaped our analysis of the formative phase around how many plans we can realistically have and how many might fail. Specifically, we looked at different failure rates from the history of large-scale technologies, especially nuclear power.

We find that in the most optimistic case, when CCS project plans double between 2022 and 2025 and their failure rate reduces from the historical 88% to 45% (the failure rate of the US nuclear power projects in the 1970’s), we could capture about 0.37 gigatons of CO₂ per year by 2030. This aligns with the majority of 2-degree Celsius pathways from the IPCC but with less than a half of 1.5-degree pathways.

– And looking forwards, toward the end of the century?

– For the acceleration phase, where technologies scale up quasi-exponentially, and then for the stable growth phase where the growth peaks, we used historical reference cases of capital-intensive technologies – solar, wind, and nuclear power – to project the most optimistic trajectory for CCS growth in the medium- to long-term. Finally, we then used the resulting growth trajectories in each phase as ‘feasibility constraints’ to IPCC climate mitigation pathways.

We find that staying on-track to 2 °C would require that in 2030–2040 CCS accelerates at least as fast as wind power did in the 2000s. After 2040, it would have to grow faster than nuclear power did in the 1970s to 1980s.

As a result, only 4% of 1.5-degree pathways and 14% of 2-degree pathways meet all three feasibility constraints in the formative, acceleration, and stable growth phases, capturing up to 600 gigatons of CO₂ by 2100. This means that a lot of policy effort and push has to go into CCS to align with IPCC pathways and increase the likelihood of meeting climate targets, but even a major policy push might not be sufficient for the 1.5-degree target.

– So, broadly speaking, what are the implications of this?

– One is the carbon budget. Beyond the total amount of CO₂ captured and stored, what also matters is how early the deployment and growth of CCS starts. We are depleting the carbon budget every day. So, the earlier technologies like CCS and CCS-related Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) technologies kick in, the more we conserve our carbon budget and increase our chances of reaching climate goals. This is one of the reasons why only 4% of 1.5-degree pathways are in-line with the feasibility constraints.

Another implication is that if we can only capture 600 gigatons of CO₂ by the end of the century, which is smaller than what most IPCC pathways require, then other technologies will need to compensate. Emerging technologies like hydrogen, and mature ones like solar and wind power—and perhaps even nuclear power—would need to grow faster to meet climate targets. This also applies to fossil fuel decline, energy efficiency improvements, and broader climate action.

– Speaking of policymakers: You mentioned these CCS projects a decade ago that failed despite having supportive policies. Are there any insights we can learn about why they failed?

– While our analysis didn’t focus on that directly, I can refer to the literature. Regarding why CCS projects failed in the past, especially in the US around 2010, where much of the interest was concentrated, the research found that the number one reason for failure was very high capital costs. We see it even now in Norway with some specific projects where capital costs escalate.

Factors like social acceptance didn’t seem to be as big of a problem back in 2010. Today, however, we’re seeing that social acceptance can be an issue. For example, the Navigator CO₂ pipeline project in the US faced significant opposition due to land use rights, with landowners not wanting CO₂ pipelines on their property.

This might be news to some, but these factors are typical not only for CCS but for any large-scale, new technology. There’s a huge amount of evidence on how large-scale projects tend to be delayed, experience cost escalations, or get cancelled. For instance, recent studies on hydrogen projects show that only about 4% of recent plans have been realized on time. As for social acceptance, the “Not In My Backyard” phenomenon has been a big issue for renewables. So, when people say that the hype and failures are unique to CCS, that’s not supported by research—neither mine nor that of my peers.

– What can we learn from this, in order to avoid policy failures in the future?

– First, we need to recognize that capital costs are a big issue for emerging technologies. When it comes to CCS in particular, capital costs vary significantly between projects. Capturing one ton of CO₂ from a power plant has a different cost than capturing it from a cement plant or using Direct Air Capture (DAC). Not every policy instrument, even the well-known 45Q tax credit in the US, adequately accounts for these differences. The 45Q only distinguishes between direct air capture and everything else, which can create artificial winners. For example, CCS projects in the ethanol industry in the US have become popular because it’s relatively cheap to capture CO₂, yet they receive the same incentive as more expensive projects like a waste incineration plants.

Second, it’s crucial to complete these projects. In the European Union during the first wave of interest around 2010, many projects failed, whereas the US managed to demonstrate the technology with projects like Petra Nova. They showed that while CCS is difficult and costly, it works when there’s sufficient investment. Several EU demonstration projects, if completed, could lead to learning and cost reductions, bringing the technology closer to take-off. In other words, demonstration projects help the market understand that the technology works and clarify what’s needed in terms of regulation, social acceptance, and other factors that can lead to project failures. But to bridge that gap, significant investments are necessary, even though costs might escalate—as we’ve seen happening in Norway and elsewhere.

– In the article, you identify three main feasibility challenges for these near-term projects project success rates, post-takeoff acceleration, and long-term expansion. Which of these do you consider the most pressing, and how can we most effectively address that?

– That ties back to what I was just saying. The challenges are aligned across the phases we study, so the most pressing one is the first: making the technology take off. This involves enabling demonstration projects and fostering technology and policy learning before drawing hasty conclusions that it doesn’t work. Therefore, the earliest challenge is the most pressing; without it, progress stalls.